

APPENDIX C: Economic Background

UK

- **General election** December 2019 returned a large Conservative majority on a platform of getting Brexit done. UK to leave the EU by 31 January 2020.
- There is still considerable uncertainty about whether the UK and EU will be able to agree the details of a **trade deal** by the deadline set by the prime minister of December 2020. This leaves open the potential risks of a no deal or a hard Brexit.
- **GDP growth** has been weak in 2019 and is likely to be around only 1% in 2020.
- **November and December MPC meetings** were concerned about weak UK growth caused by the dampening effect of Brexit uncertainties and by weak global economic growth. There has been no change in Bank Rate in 2019.
- **CPI inflation** has been hovering around the Bank of England's target of 2% during 2019, but fell again in both October and November to a three-year low of 1.5%. It is likely to remain close to, or under 2% over the next two years and so it does not pose any immediate concern to the MPC.
- **Labour market.** Employment growth has been quite resilient through 2019 until the three months to September where it fell by 58,000. However, there was an encouraging pick up again in the three months to October to growth of 24,000, which showed that the labour market was not about to head into a major downturn. The unemployment rate held steady at a 44-year low of 3.8%.
- **Wage inflation** has been steadily falling from a high point of 3.9% in July to 3.5% in October (3-month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 2.0%. As the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months.

USA

- **Growth** in 2019 has been falling after a strong start in quarter 1 at 3.1%, (annualised rate), to 2.0% in quarter 2 and then 2.1% in quarter 3; fears of a recession in 2020 have largely dissipated but growth is likely to be relatively weak.
- The strong growth in **employment numbers** during 2018 has weakened during 2019, indicating that the economy had been cooling, while inflationary pressures were also weakening.
- **The Fed** finished its series of increases in rates to 2.25 – 2.50% in December 2018. It has cut rates by 0.25% in July, September and October to end at 1.50 – 1.75%.
- In August it also ended its programme of **quantitative tightening**, (selling its holdings of treasuries etc. @ \$50bn per month during 2019).
- At its September meeting it also said it was going to **start buying Treasuries again**, although this was not to be seen as a resumption of quantitative easing

but rather an exercise to relieve liquidity pressures in the repo market. In the first month, it will buy \$60bn.

- **Trade war with China.** The trade war is depressing US, Chinese and world growth. In the EU, it is also particularly impacting Germany as exports of goods and services are equivalent to 46% of total GDP. However, progress has been made in December on agreeing a phase one deal between the US and China to roll back some of the tariffs; this gives some hope of resolving this dispute.

EUROZONE.

- **Growth** has been slowing from +1.8 % in 2018 to around half of that at the end of 2019; there appears to be little upside potential in the near future.
- **The European Central Bank (ECB)** ended its programme of quantitative easing purchases of debt in December 2018, which then meant that the central banks in the US, UK and EU had all ended the phase of post financial crisis expansion of liquidity supporting world financial markets by quantitative easing purchases of debt.
- However, the downturn in EZ growth in the second half of 2018 and during 2019, together with inflation falling well under the upper limit of its target range of 0 to 2%, (but it aims to keep it near to 2%), has prompted the ECB to take various new measures to stimulate growth starting in March.
- However, since then, the downturn in EZ and world growth has gathered momentum; at its meeting on 12 September it **cut its deposit rate** further into negative territory, from -0.4% to -0.5%, and announced a **resumption of quantitative easing purchases of debt for an unlimited period**. These purchases would start in November at €20bn per month - a relatively small amount compared to the previous buying programme.
- It is doubtful whether the various monetary policy easing measures in 2019 will have much impact on growth and, unsurprisingly, the ECB has stated that governments would need to help stimulate growth by **'growth friendly' fiscal policy**.
- Several EU countries have **coalition governments**. More recently, Austria, Spain and Italy have been in the throes of trying to form coalition governments with some unlikely combinations of parties i.e. this raises questions around their likely endurance. The latest results of German state elections has put further pressure on the frail German CDU/SDP coalition government and on the current leadership of the CDU.

CHINA.

- Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and shadow banking systems. In addition, there still needs to be a greater switch from investment in industrial capacity, property construction and infrastructure to consumer goods production.

JAPAN

- It has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

WORLD GROWTH – reversal of globalisation

- Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by **increasing globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.
- **This weak global growth outlook for 2020 and beyond therefore means that central banks are likely to come under more pressure to support growth by looser monetary policy measures; this will militate against central banks increasing interest rates and reversing the distortions in financial markets caused by a decade of ultra-low interest rates.**
- The trade war between the US and China has been a major concern to **financial markets** due to the synchronised general weakening of growth in the major economies of the world, compounded by fears that there could even be a recession looming up in the US, (though such fears have largely dissipated towards the end of 2019).
- These concerns resulted in **government bond yields falling sharply in 2019** in the developed world. If there were a major worldwide downturn in growth, central banks in most of the major economies will have limited ammunition available, in terms of monetary policy measures, when rates are already very low in most countries, (apart from the US). There are also concerns about how much distortion of financial markets has already

occurred with the current levels of quantitative easing purchases of debt by central banks and the use of negative central bank rates in some countries. The latest PMI survey statistics of economic health for the US, UK, EU and China have all been predicting a downturn in growth; this confirms investor sentiment that the outlook for growth during the year ahead is weak.