

(02) Outstanding Audit Recommendations

Code	Description	Progress Bar	Latest Note	Due Date
<p>16 PL 03 S106 Agreements</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>We recommend that as part of the Contract audit 2016/17 a review the administration of Section 106 Agreements is completed to assess the effectiveness of service delivery.</p>	<p>48%</p>	<p>20-Feb-2023 HELAA module has been delivered, currently checking and testing this and will then roll out training to the Planning Policy team. Agreed that any future changes will come direct from the team as they will be only users. This capability needs to be taken on by the Planning Policy Team.</p> <p>Temp staff are now in post and will be working on capturing plot information to support the monitoring of s106 triggers etc. moving forwards with new live applications, these details will need to be populated on DEF by the planning support team. Money to fund a Monitoring Officer has been ring-fenced to ensure these sites are monitored as part of a wider Compliance team in order that this does not become a single point of failure.</p> <p>Extension of Time Request: June 2023 to enable change to operating models moving forwards.</p>	<p>31-Dec-2022</p>

<p>20 BC 04 Testing of Service Resumption Plans</p> <p>HIGH RISK</p>	<p>A test of each Service Resumption Plan should be undertaken at least on at least an annual basis. On completion of the test a lessons learnt report should be employed to update the plan. All such documentation should be retained in Resilience Direct.</p>	<p>85%</p>	<p>20-Feb-2023 A one hour session (majority in March 2023, and June taking into account Elections), has been booked with managers of each service area that has ownership of a critical priority function. A Senior Management Team exercise has also been booked in May 2023. The aim of the one hour session is to introduce managers to the Business Continuity Playbook and the Exercise and Testing Schedule.</p> <p>Requested extension until end June 2023.</p>	<p>01-Jan-2023</p>
<p>21 BCFU 01 Update the Implementation Management Plan</p> <p>HIGH RISK</p>	<p>Observations: The Implementation Management Plan has not been updated since 2016. This is a core document which details the incident response structure, and involvement of senior managers. We recognise that there is a “standby manual” containing all current contact details, which has been tested through regular call exercises to ensure senior managers can be contacted. This helps mitigate the absence of a current Implementation Management Plan.</p>	<p>80%</p>	<p>20-Feb-2023 A Senior Management Team exercise has been scheduled for May 2023 and this action will be signed off after the plan has been validated.</p> <p>Requested extension until end June 2023 to allow the exercise report to be written.</p>	<p>01-Jan-2023</p>
<p>21 BCFU 07 identify Key</p>	<p>Observations: The Service Resumption Plans contain some</p>	<p>70%</p>	<p>27-Feb-2023 There is a basic understanding of what key</p>	<p>01-Jan-2023</p>

<p>Contractor Services</p> <p>HIGH RISK</p>	<p>analysis of the crucial contracted services which support delivery, albeit more detail could be provided. We suggest that the Council should consider what its top (five to ten) priority contracted services are, seek assurances from those suppliers that they have appropriate business continuity arrangements, and also what other alternatives might be put in place in the event of supplier failure.</p>		<p>contractors NDC priority services (1 - 4) are reliant on but knowledge beyond this is limited. Some larger scale/highly valued contracts may have service level agreements but these appear to be done on an individual basis and from the perspective of the BC lead it does not appear that there is a standard and centralised process for carrying out supply chain/ contractor due diligence with regards to ensuring external providers have BC arrangements in place.</p> <p>Beyond these highly critical services there is not a clear picture on the dependency of NDC services on external contractors or the potential impact if there was a failure in the supply chain/ relationship. Managers will have a good understanding of their own service area dependencies and relationships but this information hasn't been collated centrally or explored. Further work is needed to understand the sensitivity and value of these contracts for the whole organisation and where necessary build an understanding of the key contractors business continuity/</p>	
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			<p>security arrangements and minimum standards NDC require.</p> <p>The EPO will contact district EPO colleagues to see if any district has successfully mapped supply chains and carried out supply chain/contractor due diligence in order to identify any best practice/recommendations. A secondary meeting may be required with procurement once the EPO has a better understand of whether gaining this assurance should be done through a centralised process or needs to be lead by managers and form part of the service resumption plans.</p> <p>An extension of time until 29th December 2023 is requested to allow time to explore the best way of completing this work , and time for managers to provide the information needed to carry out a complete mapping of NDC external dependencies and their BC status.</p>	
21 CSM&R 02 Remove internet & email	Remove internet & email access from privileged accounts. Provide	80%	09-Feb-2023 PAM (Privileged Access Management) solution installed. Currently being configured	31-Dec-2022

<p>access from privileged accounts. Provide administrators with an ordinary account for email & internet access.</p> <p>HIGH RISK</p>	<p>administrators with an ordinary account for email & internet access.</p> <p>Observations and Implications Privileged user accounts (administrators) have internet access and mailboxes. Malicious code embedded or linked in web pages, email and attachments will execute with high privileges and wide system access.</p>		<p>by the Infrastructure Team, there is still work to do but excellent progress is being made.. The system is built with multi-factor authentication which adds an additional layer of security. ICT are in the test phase. We have a user who has no admin permissions, we're adding extra permissions to his account whilst minimising the risk. Historically every IT team has had carte blanche access to the entire network. We have to analyse every task the IT team does and ensure we can still do that task using the PAM solution. A misstep would be catastrophic and could result in us being locked out of the network and not able to do complete tasks.</p> <p>Extension requested – 31st August 2023.</p>	
<p>21 CSM&R 03 Follow NCSC guidance on applying the 'least privilege' model in authenticating for remote access.</p>	<p>Recommendation: Follow NCSC guidance on applying the 'least privilege' model in authenticating for remote access.</p> <p>Observations & Implications: Administrator Remote Access - Administrators authenticate for remote access with their privileged account. Attackers target vulnerabilities in remote access</p>	<p>80%</p>	<p>09-Feb-2023 PAM (Privileged Access Management) solution installed. Currently being configured by the Infrastructure Team, there is still work to do but excellent progress is being made.. The system is built with multi-factor authentication which adds an additional layer of security. ICT are in the test phase. We have a user who has no admin permissions,</p>	<p>31-Dec-2022</p>

<p>HIGH RISK</p>	<p>services and devices to obtain privileged credentials.</p>		<p>we're adding extra permissions to his account whilst minimising the risk. Historically every IT team has had carte blanche access to the entire network. We have to analyse every task the IT team does and ensure we can still do that task using the PAM solution. A misstep would be catastrophic and could result in us being locked out of the network and not able to do complete tasks.</p> <p>Extension requested – 31st August 2023.</p>	
<p>21 SC-19 O 05 Introduce quarterly pulse surveys of every employee</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>The Council undertook their survey in July 2020 to establish how people were coping at home. No survey has not been undertaken by the Council for the wider workforce to understand how Covid is impacting on the wider workforce. We consider that the Council should instigate periodic surveys as they provide insight to senior management on how staff are feeling and informs of any areas where time / resource could improve working conditions and wellbeing for staff. The move by Senior Management to carry out personalised risk assessments would enable management to provide</p>	<p>75%</p>	<p>20-Feb-2023 The comprehensive wellbeing survey has been carried out, analysed and it is the outputs from this which will help inform more targeted pulse surveys and we will also be re-running the main survey against our baseline. This is being explored through ICT and OD group, unfortunately other priorities within ICT has delayed the roll out. We are also considering a revised appraisal approach, which will introduce more frequent check-ins with staff which will focus on work but also wellbeing matters as part of that conversation.</p>	<p>31-Dec-2022</p>

	<p>tailored support. Undertaking a survey post implementation would be beneficial as this would provide a measure of impact and whether it was successful.</p> <p>In any survey it is also important to show that effective action is being taken to address concerns and issues raised by staff.</p>		<p>Request extension of time: 31st August 2023.</p>	
<p>22 E&D 05 Refresher training for recruiting managers on Unconscious Bias and other recruitment training</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>Recommendation: Introduce refresher training for recruiting managers on Unconscious Bias and other training that is involved with recruiting.</p> <p>Observation and Implications: The HR Advisor trains managers involved in recruitment on unconscious bias training, and impartiality, but no refresher training is undertaken after this. Refreshers should be done every 2 to 3 years to retain managers awareness.</p>	<p>60%</p>	<p>20-Feb-2023 First EDI has been delivered, further sessions will follow together with specific refresher training for recruiting managers.</p> <p><u>02-Mar-2023:-</u> The first training session was delivered by South West Councils with Managers on 7th February 2023 and a second session has been arranged for 9th March 2023. Following these, sessions will be held for Waste and Recycling operatives, we have also incorporated unconscious bias into our recruitment training.</p> <p>Request for extension of time to ensure suitable dates for Works and Recycling operatives to attend the sessions around their working patterns.</p>	<p>28-Feb-2023</p>

			Request for extension of time to 31st May 2023.	
<p>22 E&D 06 HR should provide a periodic report detailing the reasons for officers departing from the council.</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>Recommendation: HR should provide a periodic report to management detailing the reasons for officers departing from the council. This should inform discussion on retention strategies.</p> <p>Observation and Implications: Since NDDC moved to a new system they only report on reasons for leaving (resigned or end of contract or dismissed). Leavers are offered the opportunity of coming in for an exit interview or they send them a questionnaire to complete and return, but this has a low % of return. HR reports that any issues highlighted in the interview / questionnaire is fed back to the manager/senior manager concerned. However, HR does not currently provide a report to management detailing the reasons why officers have left the council. This is important as consideration of retention measures should be a current priority for management given the labour risk.</p>	50%	<p>23-Feb-2023 Leavers letter has been updated and all leavers will be required to attend an exit interview, first report detailing reasons for leaving will go to SMT in March 2023 and thereafter as appropriate. Action will be completed once first report has gone. So during the next reporting period this action will be shown as complete and these reports will form a regular update to SMT.</p> <p>Request an extension of time to 31st March 2023 to allow for the report to be presented to SMT.</p>	01-Jan-2023

<p>22 EPCC 01 Develop an overarching response & Recovery plan to support the DEPP Plans.</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>Observations & Implications: The Council relies on the generic plans produced by DEPP and does not have its own Emergency Plan. DEPP has told us that this is acceptable if officers are clear on their responsibilities and local circumstances. However, we consider that it would be better if the Council tailored this Emergency Plan to help direct officers in the event of an emergency.</p>	<p>75%</p>	<p>20-Feb-2023 As we would like to ideally include the National Power Outage exercise (exercise Mighty Oak) which is due to take place on 28-30 March 2023.</p> <p>An extension is requested until the end April 2023.</p>	<p>31-Dec-2022</p>
<p>22 EPCC 02 Once relevant risks from all sources have been collated, analysis of current plans & identification of any gaps in the planning process where further plans or mitigations would be beneficial</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>Observations & Implications: The LRF provides an overall County Risk Register listing the many county risks that may arise. As well as the generic DEPP central plan, the Council holds a variety of other plans such as the Rest Centre Plan, Operation London Bridge, and Ilfracombe Harbour Oil Spill Contingency Plan to help manage these risks. We consider there would be benefit in the Council considering whether the range of plans are sufficient and cover the significant risks considered most relevant to North Devon.</p>	<p>0%</p>	<p>19-Oct-2022 National Security Risk Assessment has been delayed so we do not wish to pursue this piece of work based upon out of date data. It is due for 'imminent release' (described by Govt representative) after which the LRF risk working group will meet to determine the relevance of each risk and formulate the community risk register which will feed into this piece of work. Based upon perceived timings of the above (likely meeting in early 2023).</p> <p>Request that an extension be provided until June 2023.</p>	<p>28-Feb-2023</p>
<p>22 S 01 The absence of</p>	<p>Recommendation: A simple security awareness module should be created and circulated to all staff</p>	<p>0%</p>	<p>20-Dec-2022 There are no specific external training providers which have been identified therefore in-</p>	<p>28-Feb-2023</p>

<p>security training for staff</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>periodically and included with induction training.</p> <p>Observation and Implications: The absence of security awareness training for staff increases vulnerability and therefore the likelihood of an attack on a property and/or staff being successful.</p>		<p>house training to be recorded for staff circulation.</p> <p>Request extension of time: 28th February 2023</p>	
<p>22 S 02 Consider member involvement in the review of the arrangements for Safeguarding Policy</p> <p>MEDIUM RISK</p>	<p>Recommendation: The extent of member involvement and visibility of the effectiveness of Safeguarding arrangements in the council should be considered during review of the Policy.</p> <p>Observations and Implications: Safeguarding arrangements, and specific performance is not communicated to Members as described in the Policy. There is a risk that Safeguarding developments at NDC are not known at Member level for which they are accountable.</p>	<p>0%</p>	<p>02-Mar-2023 Update from J Mann: Officers consider it appropriate for the new Leader/administration to identify a Lead Member for safeguarding in May 2023. In the interim the current Leader will pick up this responsibility.</p> <p>Request extension of time until the 30th June 2023.</p>	<p>31-Dec-2022</p>